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Financing education at the local level:
A study of the Russian region of Novgorod
Kitty Stewart'
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Rapid decentralization since 1992 has given substantial responsibility for key 
government services not just to Russia's 88 regions (oblasts) but also to its 1800 local 
authorities (raions). It seems likely that this will have had consequences for the equity of 
provision of these services. However, very little is yet known about how the fiscal system 
works at the raion level. The majority of studies of the impact of decentralization in 
Russia have concentrated on the relationship between the federal government and the 
oblast.
This paper attempts to fill in a small part of this information gap by presenting an 
analysis of the system of financing of one service, education, in one oblast, Novgorod, in 
North-West Russia. Representing the results of field research, it asks what fiscal 
mechanisms exist to ensure that all raions can meet their responsibilities, and examines 
how successful these are in preventing raion disparities in education financing. It also 
presents some evidence on the role played by non-budgetary sources of funding.
The paper finds that Novgorod has a strong redistributive mechanism which goes a 
long way towards equalizing budget revenues across raions, but it confirms reports that 
education expenditure in all parts of the oblast is at a disturbingly low level. This in turn 
is leading schools to raise additional funds from parents, with consequences for both 
regional and individual equality.
Keywords: Decentralization, Education, Russia 
JEL classifications: H71, H 72,122, P52
' The information for this study was collected during a month in Novgorod Oblast in June-July 1997. I 
would like to express my gratitude to the Deputy Head of the Oblast Administration, N.P.Fyodorova, for 
giving me permission to go ahead, and to the many people I met in the Oblast Administration, the Novgorod 
City Administration and the Raion Administrations in Shimsk and Valdai Raions for their time, assistance 
and hospitality. 1 am grateful for the financial assistance of both the EUI and the UNICEF International 
Child Development Centre. UNICEF-ICDC and UNICEF Moscow also provided invaluable logistical 
support: I owe special thanks to Olga Remenets in particular, without whom my trip would almost certainly 
never have happened. Finally, John Micklewright and Gaspar Fajth have given me useful comments on an 






















































































































































































The implications of fiscal decentralization for the equitable provision of public 
services in Russia is becoming an increasingly popular subject (see for example, 
Bahl et al 1993, Klugman 1995, McAuley 1996, Stewart 1997). Almost all work 
done so far, however, has concentrated on the relationship between the 88 ‘subjects 
of the federation’ and the federal government, rather than between the subjects and 
their own sub-regional units. The reasons for this are understandable: substantial 
inter-regional differences make these relationships interesting and important, while 
data constraints present an obstacle to a study of the sub-regional level. For obvious 
reasons indicators available with regional breakdowns are given by region rather 
than by raion (which would mean 1800 units).
At the same time, there are several reasons to want to take the analysis beyond 
the inter-regional level. First and foremost, many of the expenditure responsibilities 
which tend to be classified as the responsibility of ‘regional authorities or below’ are 
in reality the responsibility of ‘below’; that is, of the local (raion or municipal) 
authorities. In the sphere of education, for example, kindergartens and general 
schools are now raion responsibility, meaning the vast majority of pre-compulsory 
and compulsory educational institutions fall under raion control. There are certain 
federal constraints on provision, but in principle it is up to the raion to decide how 
much to budget for these institutions and how the budget should be allocated.
Second, while regions are likely to be more homogenous as units than the 
federation as a whole, with less severe internal differences in economic 
circumstances, there is still room for considerable intra-regional disparity, both 
between urban and rural areas and between different towns. These differences may 
be small in comparison with the inter-regional disparities, but this is by no means 
certain; at least not certain enough for sub-regional issues to be ignored. It is 
possible that local authorities even within a single region face very different 
economic constraints. While there are federal regulations on what the region is 
required to do to ensure all raions can cover a minimum budget, these are not 
specific and it is not clear how they are enforced.
The aim of this paper is to fill in a small part of the hole of information about 
what takes place below the level of the region, by presenting an analysis of the 
system of financing of education in Novgorod Oblast. Why education and why 
Novgorod? Education is chosen in part simply as a way of focusing the analysis on a 
single sphere as a representative of others: if provision of education is very different 
across the region, then we might expect provision of other goods to be so too. But it 
is also chosen because of the importance of equality of provision of education in 



























































































generalizable but tries to draw a fuller picture of the situation in the education sector 
in particular.
The reasons for the choice of Novgorod Oblast are perhaps less transparent. In a 
sense any region might have done, given that the purpose of the exercise is to see 
how education is financed in a region, any region. But Novgorod seemed to be 
typical in a number of ways. It is an industrial region in European Russia, and along 
with most of European Russia has suffered considerably during the transition. Its 
industry traditionally centred around the development of radio technologies used 
predominantly by the military; over the past five years demand has virtually 
disappeared. It is now poorer than average but not among the very poorest of 
Russian regions, ranking one third of the way down the list of recipients of federal 
transfers.
At the same time, however, it has a progressive administration which has 
received wide recognition for its innovation: last year for instance the World Bank 
declared it to have one of the six most favourable climates in Russia for foreign 
investment. This last feature is clearly not so typical of other regions. The choice of 
Novgorod might be justifiable all the same as a deliberate decision to examine a case 
likely to present the better face of sub-regional organization; thus avoiding drawing 
over pessimistic conclusions on the basis of a single wayward region. In fact a more 
decisive consideration was that it proved hard to gain access, for reasons which are 
perhaps obvious, to regions which seemed promising as disastrous cases. This is 
also likely to be a difficulty in any attempt to follow this study up with a study of a 
contrasting region. In any case, in what follows I try to give an idea of how much of 
what I discovered during my stay in the oblast seems to me to be generalizable and 
how much likely to be unique to Novgorod.
The paper begins by introducing Novgorod and the circumstances in which it 
finds itself. The rest of the paper is divided into two parts. The first part is concerned 
with general financing issues which are essential to an understanding of how 
education is financed, but not specific to the sector. In this part I try to answer three 
questions in particular. First, what are the raions’ expenditure responsibilities in 
practice? Second, what mechanisms exist to ensure that all raions can meet these 
responsibilities? And third, how far is what happens dictated by federal law, and 
how much is left to oblast initiative? This last question is important to our 
understanding of how typical the Novgorod situation might be.
The second part of the paper turns to look at education. The focus here is on the 
extent of disparities in education finance across the oblast’s raions, but the analysis 
is broader in two senses. First, it tries to give some idea of the incentives and 
constraints raion education departments face. This is partly motivated by the fact that 




























































































formally requires, which in turn suggests that a high degree of uniformity might 
persist right across the country. Second, it presents some evidence on other aspects 
of inequality: it asks whether there is an urban-rural split in education provision, and 
discusses the role of non-budgetary sources of funding, and how these may be 
affecting both regional and individual equity of educational opportunity.
The paper concentrates on the picture in 1996: it aims to provide a snapshot 
portrait and makes no attempt to try to track changes in the situation over recent 
years. This is partly for practical reasons: budget data was hard to come by for more 
than one year, while tracing changes over time would present considerable 
difficulties, both because of the need for a price deflator and because of the speed of 
changes that have taken place (and are still taking place annually) in the 
responsibilities of different levels of government. But a snapshot also seems a 
reasonable starting point given the little that is known so far about equity and public 
finance at the sub-oblast level.
2. Administration, history and economics: a brief tour of Novgorod1
Novgorod Oblast is in North-West Russia, 600 kilometres north-west of Moscow 
and 200 kilometres south of St. Petersburg. Smaller than average for a Russian 
region, it has a population of 740,000, some one third of whom live in the 
administrative centre, Novgorod City. A further 120,000 live in the three other main 
urban centres, Borovich, Staraya Russa and Chudova. In total, just over 70% of the 
population are urbanized, close to the Russian average. The oblast is divided into 22 
sub-regional divisions, called towns (if solely urban) or raions. For simplicity, below 
I use the term ‘raion’ to include all 22 divisions. Novgorod City is in fact the only 
such town; most raions have mixed urban-rural populations but there are five which 
are fully rural. These are also the smallest, with six to ten thousand inhabitants each.
Like all Russian regions, the Oblast has its own elected parliament (Duma), as 
well as a directly elected Governor who heads the Duma and the Oblast 
Administration (a non-elected civil service). All oblast policy and oblast budgets 
must be approved by both the Duma and the Governor. Each raion also has its own 
small elected Duma and its own Administration, headed by a directly elected mayor. 
Neither the Oblast Duma nor Administration therefore has direct control over the 
actions of raion politicians, who are acccountable only to their electorates. In 
essence the system is similar to that in most of Europe, where local government




























































































functions independently of regional or national government. However, personalities 
seem to play a more important role than party politics in local elections: in the 
elections to the Oblast Duma in October 1997, only one out of twenty-six successful 
candidates had a party affiliation (a member of the Communist Party). The majority 
of the others were directors of large enterprises or heads of local administrations 
(RFE/RL Newsline, October 21st 1997).
Novgorod is now often confused with its more famous namesake, Nizhniy 
Novgorod (800 kilometres away on the Upper Volga), but it occupies by far the 
more prominent place in Russian history. Founded in 859, it is Russia’s oldest town 
and was also briefly capital of Rus, the predecessor of modem Russia. At its peak 
Novgorod controlled a territory which stretched from the Arctic Ocean to the Volga 
and from the Gulf of Finland to the Urals, allowing it to establish itself as one of the 
key East-West trading points and to rename itself ‘Lord Novgorod the Great’ (a 
name still used on tourist brochures, and to mark the distinction from the upstart 
Nizhniy).2 But the wealth that came from trade was not able to protect the town from 
Ivan the Terrible and his minions in pursuit of hegemony for Muscovy: in 1570 Ivan 
arrived in person to initiate a five week masssacre from which Novgorod never 
recovered.
Its more recent history has not been so illustrious. During the Soviet era there 
was little to distinguish it from the other industrial regions of Central and North- 
West Russia. Its primary industries were radio-electronics, with a strong leaning 
towards military production and a sideline in radios and televisions for the consumer 
market, timber processing and chemicals. By the end of the 1980s about 13% of the 
working population were employed in agriculture, roughly the Russian average. If 
Novgorod stood out it was for poor levels of social indicators relative both to the 
rest of the North-West and to Russia as a whole: in 1990 infant mortality was 18.3 
per thousand compared to 16.9 in the North-West and 17.4 in Russia; male life 
expectancy at birth was 61.6 years against 64.2 in the North-West and 64.0 in 
Russia.
The transition has hit the oblast hard. The radio-electronics industry has suffered 
most: military demand has collapsed and lines of production aimed at the consumer 
market have found it difficult to survive on their own, particularly in the face of 
cheap imports from the Far East. In Novgorod City only two of the fifteen largest 
firms remain in operation; one is the (heavily polluting) chemical plant AKRON,
'  According to local folklore, Peter the Great made Novgorod drop its titles when he founded 
nearby St. Petersburg. But in January 1998 the Novgorod City and Oblast legislatures voted to 
restore the name Velikii Novgorod (Novgorod the Great). The change is waiting approval from 





























































































which makes fertilizers, and which is the only firm in the oblast to have managed to 
keep production stable, largely due to exports to countries which presumably do not 
want to suffer the consequences of production themselves. In total there are three 
chemical plants in the oblast, and in 1995 these three between them accounted for 
34% of the volume of production.3 An unofficial estimate is that AKRON alone 
currently provides one half of oblast budget revenues raised in the region.
These developments are illustrated in Table 1, which shows production of a 
series of goods over the period 1991-1995. This is likely to be a better indication of 
the state of the economy than the unemployment rate, which rose from 5% in 1992 
to 10% in 1995 but which almost certainly hides substantial underemployment: it is 
common for workers to remain on the official employment roll despite not having 
worked in practice (or been paid) for several years. Table 1 also shows the collapse 
in production in the agricultural sector. Most kholkozi have ceased functioning. 
Former workers farm small plots of land privately for their own consumption and for 
small scale trade.
Table 1. Production o f a series o f goods in Novgorod Oblast 1991-1995
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Fertilizers, thousand tonnes 680.0 629.9 585.2 570.0 664.0
Industrial wood, thousand m3 2417.1 2011.9 1355.3 1113.1 1229.3
Paper, thousand tonnes 65.5 44.0 23.8 6.9 7.2
Televisions, thousands 236.5 210.2 240.8 95.9 16.6
Videos, thousands 57.7 68.9 47.7 13.8 0.8
Meat, thousand tonnes 32.5 26.9 19.0 13.6 9.1
Dairy products (converted 
into whole milk), th. tonnes
86.5 38.2 34.9 28.7 22.8
Source: Novgorod Oblast in Figures, Novgorod Oblast Committee of State Statistics, 1996
Overall though, and perhaps due to the success of the chemical industry, the 
collapse of production does not look so bad in comparison to the Russian average. In 
1994 industrial production in Novgorod was 63% of its 1990 level, while in Russia 
as a whole it was just 51%. But the gap in social indicators has continued to widen. 
By 1994 infant mortality in Novgorod had risen to 20.8, compared to 18.6 for 
Russia, while the average for the North-West had actually fallen to 16.1. Male life 
expectancy in Novgorod was just 55 years, compared to 56.6 in the North-West and 
57.6 in Russia as a whole.
Prospects for the region look relatively bright. Earlier this year the World Bank 
declared Novgorod one of the most favourable six regions in Russia for foreign




























































































investment, while in June The Economist sang its praises as one of Russia's boom 
towns.4 While this may be a bit premature, it is true that foreign investment has 
begun to arrive, most notably from Cadbury’s, which last year opened a big 
chocolate factory just outside the town of Chudova. The reason for this success 
seems to be a progressive and active administration headed by a young and dynamic 
governor, Mikhail Prusak: Alexei Lavrov, an advisor in Yeltsin’s office on regional 
affairs, recently described Novgorod as one of only six reformist regions in Russia 
(‘going more by feeling than by statistics’).5 One example of the administration’s 
activity is the new experimental scheme of tax holidays for small businesses 
investing in any of the four most depressed areas of the country. These businesses 
will be exempt from all profit tax, with even their share of federal profit tax paid for 
them by the oblast government.
For the moment, however, the brighter future has yet to materialize. Novgorod 
may look promising as one of the successful regions of the next century, but today it 
ranks firmly in the bottom half. In 1995 20% of Novgorod’s revenues came from the 
Federal Support Fund, compared with an average across Russia of 8%. Furthermore, 
although the new tax scheme shows that the problem of uneven regional 
development is being addressed, considerable disparities between areas persist as 
yet. Only two towns, Chudova and Novgorod, have so far seen any foreign 
investment, while rural areas have almost no local sources of budgetary income. The 
extent of raion disparities in own revenues — and the mechanisms used to even them 
out — are discussed further in Section 3.
3. The fiscal system and its implications for the raion
This part of the paper explores the general structure of the fiscal system as it affects 
the raion. It sets out to answer three questions in particular. First, what are the 
raion’s expenditure responsibilities? Second, what mechanisms exist to ensure that 
raions have the revenues they need to meet these responsibilities? And third, is the 
system dictated by federal law or does oblast initiative play an important role? This 
last question is clearly important in affecting our ability to reach generalizations on 
the basis of the Novgorod story.
The section contains of necessity a large amount of descriptive material. To try to 
make this easier on the reader the information is sub-divided. In Section 3.1 I detail
4 ‘Russia: An old-fashioned, modem look’. The Economist, June 14th 1997.





























































































the raion’s expenditure responsibilities, putting these into context with some 
examples of the local authority burden in other countries. In Section 3.2 I tum to 
look at revenue sources: Section 3.2.1 looks briefly at some international examples 
of local authority revenue structure; Section 3.2.2 describes the rules as laid down 
by Russian federal law; Section 3.2.3 turns to look at the way the system works in 
practice in Novgorod; and Section 3.2.4 analyses how far the Novgorod system 
succeeds in providing adequate revenues for less well-off raions. Finally, Section 3.3 
sums up by clarifying the answers to the three questions posed above.
3.1 Expenditure responsibilities
The decentralization process of the last few years has not stopped at the level of the 
oblast: federal law has delegated many responsibilities directly to the raion level. 
The Federal Law on Local Government6 includes among the responsibilities of raion 
governments the ‘organization, maintenance and development’ of local pre-school 
and school institutions, institutions of professional education, and local health care 
institutions. Local public transport, local roads, the police force, the housing fund 
and the provision of social support and employment assistance all also fall into the 
raion’s sphere of control.7
In practice the process of decentralization is an ongoing one. It is up to the oblast 
to implement federal law in the area, and the speed and extent to which it does so 
also seems up to the oblast to decide: presumably the federal government has more 
serious things to worry about than who is in charge of a particular school, and will 
interfere only in cases of serious violation of the law. In some cases, the federal level 
itself still holds responsibility for items that should fall under oblast control. The 
result is that the location of responsibility for a series of items will vary across 
oblasts for some time to come. As an example within the education sector, 
professional-technical institutions (PTUs) were taken over from the federal level by 
Novgorod as an oblast responsibility only last year and at the oblast’s initiative, 
whereas in principle as institutions of professional education they ought to be raion 
responsibilities. Responsibility for special schools and boarding schools (mostly 
‘correctional’ schools) was handed over by the Novgorod Oblast Administration to 
the raions as of January 1st 1996, but this may not have happened in all oblasts.
These imprécisions notwithstanding, the bulk of institutions delegated by law to 
the local budget ought in practice to be found there by now, and Table 2 below 
should be fairly representative of the situation across the federation. The table shows
6 Russian Federation Federal Law on General Principles of the Organization of Local Government 
in the Russian Federation, adopted by the State Duma on 12 August 1995; further referred to as 
‘Federal Law on Local Government’.




























































































the percentage of oblast expenditure in Novgorod in 1996 which was spent at the 
raion (rather than the oblast) level; along with an estimate of what this is likely to 
represent as a percentage of total (consolidated) expenditure in each sphere. The 
table shows that about 60% of all Novgorod Oblast expenditures was spent at the 
raion level, representing nearly 30% of consolidated budget expenditure. The raion’s 
role is most important in the social sphere, where it spent over 90% of the oblast 
total in 1996, corresponding to some 80% of consolidated expenditure. About 80% 
of the total budget for education was spent at the raion level.






raion share in 
total exp (%)k
Total expenditure, of which: 61 28
Administration 78 49
Law enforcement 16 4
National economy, of which:' 73 53
Housing 81 81
Social expenditure, of which: 92 78
Education 95 81
Health and physical culture 91 83
Culture, art and mass media 65 46
Social policy 96 79
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the Finance Committee of Novgorod Oblast 
Administration, and on Ministry of Finance territorial and federal expenditure data for 1995, 
printed in Dmitriev 1996. * The total spent by all raions in Novgorod as a percentage of total 
expenditure in Novgorod Oblast in 1996. b A rough approximation of the raion share of 
consolidated expenditure, equal to the first column multiplied by the fraction of consolidated 
expenditure spent at the territorial level in 1995 (1996 not available). c National Economy’ also 
includes subsidies to industry and agriculture and expenditure on developing market infrastructure, 
transport and the environment.
It is worth commenting briefly on how this situation compares to that in other 
states in Eastern Europe and beyond. Are Russian raions being given unusual levels 
of responsibility, or are their duties much the same as that of other local authorities? 
Table 3 gives the share of total government expenditure spent at local level in a 
number of other European countries in the early 1990s. There is considerable 
variation, reflecting a range of government systems from highly centralized to very 
decentralized. The Russian level fits somewhere in the middle, with a local 




























































































considerably lower than that in Lithuania and Sweden. Of the countries given, local 
authorities have main responsibility for the provision of pre-primary, primary and 
secondary education in all except Slovakia, Romania, Poland and Austria (pre- 
primary and primary only), and the Czech Republic, where responsibility is shared 
with district offices of the Ministry of Education (Van Haecht 1996 and Barrow 
1997).
Table 3. Local budget expenditure as share o f total government expenditure in
Local share o f 
total
Local share o f  
total
Czech Republic 21 Germany 29
Slovakia 12 France 27
Poland 22 UK 27
Romania 17 Denmark 31
Lithuania 59 Sweden 38
Source: Council of Europe 1997, p. 19. All figures refer to 1994 except France (1992) and 
Romania, Lithuania and Germany (1993). Lithuania has since experienced a substantial 
recentralization process (Klugman 1997).
3.2 Revenue sources
But where does the raion get the revenue to cover these responsibilities? This is an 
important question for two reasons. First, the structure of the revenue system is a 
key determinant of what local responsibility means in practice. The numbers in 
Tables 2 and 3 could reflect several very different scenarios: while it may be that 
local authorities are indeed the ones deciding what to spend and where to spend it, it 
could also be the case that the local budget is really just a stopover for already 
earmarked central government resources.
Second, and more important for this paper, is the equity question. If raions do 
have real responsibility for such an important range of expenditures, there is clearly 
a concern about what will happen in poorer areas. Particularly if inter-raion 
economic disparities are large, we want to know what kind of transfer mechanisms 
exist to protect these areas and how effective these mechanisms are.
In Section 3.2.1 I look briefly at some examples of local authority revenue 
structure from other countries. In Section 3.2.2 I describe the rules of the system in 
Russia as laid down by federal law and discuss how far they leave room for 
differences across oblasts in interpretation. In Section 3.2.3 I turn to look at the 
system as it works in Novogorod, and in Section 3.2.4 ask how successful this 





























































































A standard textbook revenue system would give local authorities control over a 
key local tax to give it autonomy, usually an income or property tax, and would then 
use a system of general and unconditional transfers to support the revenues of poorer 
regions.8 These latter would be based on a formula which takes into account 
indicators of local expenditure need as well as an estimate of the region’s tax base 
(independent of how far the local authority chooses to tax it), the idea being to give 
local populations a choice about tax-rates and service levels without penalizing tax­
payers in poorer areas. In addition, there may be conditional or earmarked transfers, 
these to fund goods which central government wants to encourage local governments 
to provide or which they provide in an agency role for the centre.
It is difficult to summarize international experience because it is so varied, but on 
the surface this is essentially how the system works in many European countries. In 
most cases local authorities have some control over either income tax (e.g. 
Scandinavia and Switzerland) or property tax (e.g. Germany and the Netherlands), 
although in many cases they are constrained in how far they can adjust tax rates, 
either for economic or political reasons: in France and Austria property tax rates are 
set locally but only within limits imposed by the centre, and the UK also moved in 
this direction with the introduction of ‘rate-capping’ in 1984 (see Council of Europe, 
1997; Batley and Stoker, 1991). In Central and Eastern Europe as a rule central 
governments still hold on tightly to their fiscal tools: local authorities have limited 
control over either income or property tax in the Baltics, Hungary, Poland and 
Romania, but no control at all in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic or Slovakia (Council 
of Europe, 1997).
Most countries also have a transfer system along the lines of the one above. 
Allocation of transfers are based on estimates of local tax base adjusted by needs 
criteria, which can include population mix and density (numbers of pre-school and 
school children, young people and elderly), children in one-parent families, length of 
roads, age of housing and level of labour costs. Variations on this theme can be 
found in the UK, Germany, France, Denmark, Sweden, Portugal and Australia 
(Council of Europe, 1997; Norton, 1994; Searle 1995).
The importance of transfers relative to local tax revenues will clearly depend on 
both the emphasis given to equalization relative to autonomy and on the level of 
initial disparity to be equalized. Table 4 shows a range of possibilities by giving an 
overview of sources of municipal funding in a number of European countries. In the 
Scandinavian countries local taxes make up the majority of local revenues;
8 This is of course a gross oversimplification. See Oates (1994) for an overview of the public 




























































































elsewhere there is more of a balance between local taxes and general grants. In 
Romania, France and the UK, over 25% of local authority revenue comes from 
general grants, although Romania and the UK are the only countries where grants 
are more important revenue sources than local taxes and fees and charges taken 
together. Comparisons are confused however by the role played in some countries of 
‘shared taxes’, which are taxes with rates set by the centre but receipts shared 
between different government levels. In some cases (e.g. Germany) receipts from 
these taxes are shared out across local authorities with the intention of equalizing 
revenues, making them really a form of general grant. A second reason for caution is 
that countries which appear to have only a small role for grants may of course have 
very effective equalization schemes which concentrate on the very poorest areas; in 
other countries all regions may contribute to the central budget, and then all may 
receive general transfers of varying sizes. The most important information the table 
gives us is really that a wide variety of combinations of revenue sources are 
possible.















Czech Republic 16 12 23 8 10 11 20
Poland 21 7 23 15 22 0 12
Romania 5 16 33 25 21 0 0
France 36 2 0 24 0 10 28
Germany 19 16 17 15 13 9 11
UK 11 6 17 32 27 0 6
Denmark 51 22 2 12 0 2 12
Sweden 61 8 0 11 8 1 11
NB. ‘Local tax’ means local authority decides rate (in some cases within limits). ‘Shared taxes’ are 
those with rates set at the centre. Source: Council of Europe, 1997. For relevant years see note to
Table 3.
Finally, does international experience give us any examples of the role played in 
local financing by regional level authorities? In countries which have three tiers of 
government, does the middle level tend to have any control in determining 
equalization mechanisms and the extent of local autonomy within the region? The 
answer again is varied, as the cases of Germany and Austria illustrate. In Germany, a 
degree of control is given to the Lander (regional) governments over the operation of 
the transfer mechanism, degrees of local equalization differing fairly significantly 




























































































structure is very similar, the federal constitution is much more explicit on the 
relations between regional and municipal authorities, and the situation across regions 
is basically uniform (Council of Europe 1988, p.6). In laying out below the basic 
rules that govern local authority financing in Russia, I assess how much room is left 
for regional difference in practice.
3.2.2 Russia: the basic rules
There are two important aspects to the raion revenue system in Russia. First, the 
basic system is established by federal law to be one of ‘revenue-sharing’ (like the 
‘shared taxes’ in Table 4). Rates for the main taxes are set at the federal level, and 
raions keep a share of the tax revenues raised from these taxes on their own 
territories. The remainder is handed up to the oblast, which in turn keeps a share 
determined by the federal government and passes the rest to the centre. The four 
most important of these shared taxes — profit tax, income tax, value added tax 
(VAT) and enterprise property tax — together make up some 70% of tax revenues in 
both Novgorod Oblast and the Russian Federation as a whole.9 A degree of control 
over the system is given to the oblast: first, the oblast can determine the proportion 
of the non-federal share each raion can retain (shares can also vary across raions), 
although there are federal constraints on the oblast’s choice, as discussed below. 
Second, since 1996 the oblast has been able to set its own rate for profit tax, up to a 
maximum of 22%, and can also choose to vary this rate across raions (allowing the 
new ‘tax-holiday’ scheme introduced in Novgorod’s more depressed raions). 
However, the raion itself has no say in either of these decisions.
This system has two immediate problems, First, it clearly leaves raions with little 
control over their budgets: they get whatever they happen to raise and are allowed to 
retain from the main taxes. Raions do have the right to the proceeds from a series of 
minor taxes and charges that they can set themselves,10 but these in general form a 
small percentage of the total (some 10%; see Table 6 below). At the same time, 
however, this is not a dissimilar amount to that in a large number of other countries, 
as shown in Table 4.
Second, there is an immediate equity concern. If raions begin with very different 
tax bases, a revenue sharing system clearly offers the potential for large disparities in 
raion budget revenues. Germany also has a revenue-sharing system for several taxes,
9 Profit tax made up 27% of tax revenues in the consolidated Novgorod budget in 1996 (33% of 
the 1995 RF consolidated budget); income tax 23% (10%); VAT 14% (24%); enterprise property 
tax 5% (4%).
10 Russian Federation Federal Law on Basic Budgetary Rights and Rights of Formation and Use of 
Extra-Budgetary Funds, adopted by the Supreme Soviet 15 April 1993; further referred to as 




























































































but there the shares kept by the local authority are not necessarily the shares raised 
there: the Lander can redistribute the share and hand out greater shares to poorer 
areas (Council of Europe 1997). In Russia this cannot happen and each raion keeps 
its own share.
This is where the second aspect of the revenue system comes into play. Federal 
legislation does impose on the oblast the requirement to address inter-raion 
disparities. This requirement is based on the concept of a ‘minimum necessary 
budget’. Every oblast must calculate such a budget for each of its raions, and then in 
theory the oblast must ensure that the raion has the resources to cover it. This should 
be done first by setting revenue sharing rates for each raion so as to allow them to 
cover 70% of the minimum budget with their own tax receipts (if possible), and then 
by way of transfers to the raion level."
Under federal law, the ‘minimum budget’ is to be based on the raion’s current 
(non-capital) expenditures in the previous year. This figure is then adjusted to take 
into account the rate of inflation, the cost of providing any additional services 
devolved to the raion (or removed from the raion) during the year, and any changes 
made by the oblast or federal authorities in ‘social and financial norms and 
standards’ (the latter presumably meaning changes in the levels of benefits, minimum 
wages etc).1 2 13Raion tax shares must then be set so that at least 70% of the minimum 
budget can be covered by their own retention of revenues from the main taxes.11 In 
addition, the oblast government is required to use additional mechanisms (‘dotations 
and subventions’) to ensure that the raion has the means to cover the remainder of 
the minimum budget.14 In essence this is a mini-version of the principle applied at 
the federal level to try to ensure that all subjects of the federation can meet their 
essential budgetary needs (see Stewart 1997). Transfers are unconditional: the 
minimum budget is calculated as a single figure, and there are no requirements on 
the raion to spend grant receipts in particular ways. Nor are there federal provisions 
for specific transfers for particular sectors.
To sum up, federal law allows the raion little autonomy over the size of its 
budget, but appears to guarantee less well-off raions a fairly strong degree of 
protection. How much role is there for the oblast in all this? Federal government 
regulations seem tight, but in practice there is limited room for oblast initiative, or at 
least variation in arrangements across oblasts. This arises, first, from the fact that the 
method to be used to calculate the minimum budget is specified only vaguely. In 
Novgorod, for instance, the criteria suggested are used as guidelines, but additional
11 Federal Law on Budgetary Rights, Articles 1 and 9.
12 Federal Law on Budgetary Rights, Article 7.
13 Federal Law on Budgetary Rights, Article 9.




























































































factors are taken into account as well, including changes in the number of school-age 
children.15 There are also no formulae dictating what the weight of each factor 
should be. The second area which is underdetermined is the transfer system: the 
source of revenues for transfers is not mentioned; nor is any provision made to 
ensure that funds are sufficient. This opens questions about where the resources are 
to come from, and what happens if an oblast simply decides it cannot afford to run 
such a fund. The solutions found in Novgorod are not necessarily universal solutions.
3.2.3 Novgorod Oblast: the revenue system in practice
This section examines how the system works in practice, looking first at the 
allocation of revenue shares across revenues and then at the transfer mechanisms. 
The following section assesses the success of these mechanisms in achieving 
equalization of revenues.
Table 5 shows the share of the four major taxes kept by the raion rather than fed 
into the oblast budget. Effectively what happens is that most raions keep everything 
they raise. Given that many of the raions have little or no tax base, this is the only 
way to get close to meeting the 70% requirement; I was told in the oblast budget 
department that in practice for some raions even this is not enough. The oblast 
budget depends heavily on income from just two raions, Novgorod City and 
Chudova. The oblast is entitled to all receipts from some smaller taxes and charges, 
but receipts of profit tax from Novgorod and Chudova and VAT from Novgorod
Table 5. Percentages o f revenues from the major taxes to be retained in the raion,
Tax Percentage to be retained 
in the raion
Total share to remain in 
raion or oblast




Income tax 90% all 90%
Value added tax 7% Novgorod City 
25% all others
25%
Enterprise property tax 60% all 100%
Total share to be retained by either raion or oblast, as opposed to being passed up to the federal 
level. Federal profit tax is set at a rate of 13%; subjects can set their own rates up to a maximum 
of 22%. Sources: Novgorod Oblast Law ‘On the Oblast Budget in 1996’, accepted by the Oblast 
Duma 30 Jan 1996; Russian Federation Federal Law on the Federal Budget in 1995, Article 14.
15 Novgorod Oblast Law on the Budgetary Process in the Oblast, approved by the Oblast Duma 6 




























































































composed some 65% of oblast tax revenues in 1996.
Despite the fact that most raions retain the majority of their taxes, in many cases 
these taxes comprise a small part of the overall budget, as reflected in Table 6 
below. While 80% of budget revenue in Novgorod City is raised in the raion itself, 
and 50% in Valdai Raion (an industrial raion in the south-east of the oblast); in the 
smaller, predominantly rural raions of Shimsk and Poddorsky the percentage raised 
in the raion is only 30% and 20% respectively. These raions are both dependent on 
transfers from the oblast budget for the vast majority of their revenues.



















Novgorod C 54.4 9.0 16.1 79.2 8.1 11.8 20.0
Valdaisky 34.3 4.5 11.7 50.5 22.4 25.2 47.6
Shimsky 20.2 7.1 3.9 31.2 17.4 48.7 66.1
Poddorsky 12.1 5.2 1.3 18.6 12.4 61.3 73.7
Total (all 
raions)
44.5 7.0 10.1 61.6 14.5 20.6 35.1
Source: Author's calculations using data provided by Finance Committee of Novgorod Oblast 
Administration. Notes: ‘Big 4 taxes’ are profit tax, income tax, VAT and enterprise property tax. 
‘Own taxes and fines’ are those over which raion exercises control. ‘MS & Dot’ns’ (Mutual 
Settlements and Dotations) are transfers made to compensate raions for extra responsibilities or 
mandates handed down by higher levels of government. ‘Eq. transfers’ are those made according 
to formula and intended to equalize revenues, as explained below. Where total own revenue and 
total transfers do not sum to 100, the difference is made up by subsidies and credits.
As Table 6 illustrates, since 1995 raions have received two types of transfer from 
higher level government. The idea of the first type, which I have classified to include 
‘mutual settlements’ and ‘dotations’, is to satisfy the obligations of higher levels of 
government to lower. Mutual settlements are intended to make up for any change in 
expenditure at one level of government caused by a decision taken at another level 
(such as a centrally determined increase in public sector salaries, when salaries are 
paid by the local level). Dotations are meant to cover additional expenditures arising 
as the result of the handover of responsibilities from oblast to municipal budget. The 
size of the transfer in each of these cases is decided by the oblast after negotiation 
with the raions. In both cases transfers are always made by the oblast rather than the 




























































































it reaches a decision on compensation with the oblast government, which then goes 
on to conduct negotiations with the raion authorities in its territory.
The second type of transfer is used directly for equalizing purposes. These are the 
transfers the federal law requires oblasts to make in order to bring all raions up to a 
minimum budget. As already noted, however, the law contains no regulations about 
how such a transfer mechanism should work, or on what resources it should be 
based. The details are left to the oblast’s initiative. For the last two years Novgorod 
has used a formula system closely resembling the one used to distribute transfers 
from the federal level to the oblasts (see Stewart 1997). Details of the formula are 
given in Appendix A, but essentially the mechanism works in two stages. First, 
raions are classified as ‘in need of support’ if their predicted per capita revenue in 
the year in question is less than predicted per capita revenue in the oblast as a whole: 
they are then awarded transfers in proportion to the difference. In the second stage, 
raions are labelled ‘in need of considerable support’ if their revenues after first stage 
transfers are still going to be insufficient to meet their estimated ‘minimum necessary 
budget’. In that case they are allocated the difference. The minimum budget is 
calculated as dictated by federal law, except that 1991 expenditures are used as the 
base, rather than last year’s expenditures.16 These are then adjusted for inflation and 
for changes in federal standards (such as wage changes). Novgorod has also 
introduced some additional criteria not laid down in federal law, such as changes in 
demographic structure (number of children).
In essence then, the idea is that each raion gets topped up to its minimum budget, 
but with a little extra for those raions with below average revenues, regardless of 
their necessary expenditures. But this leaves the question of where the funds come 
from to cover these transfers. As minimum budgets are calculated quite 
independently of oblast revenues, there is no guarantee that there will be sufficient 
funds to cover them. In practice then, the allocated sum really determines, not a 
fixed rouble amount, but the share the raion will receive of the funds that are 
available in practice. In other words, despite the law, raions will only be sure of 
covering their minimum budgets if transfer funds allow.
So where do the transfer funds come from? In Novgorod what happens is simple: 
the oblast takes the transfers which it receives from the federal transfer fund (the 
Federal Fund for Financial Support to the Subjects of the Federation), and simply 
passes them on to the raions using the formula above. Naturally what this means is 
that raions are very dependent on federal transfers being made in full and on time.
16 The Federal Fund for Financial Support has also calculated necessary expenditures on the basis 
of 1991 expenditures since 1996 (before then it used expenditures in 1993). So this is accepted 




























































































neither of which happen in practice. In 1996, about two thirds of the initial allocation 
arrived, and this came in trickles through the year. What the oblast does then is 
allocate piecemeal to raions depending on the urgency of need; naturally some raions 
end up receiving more of their initial allocation than others. By the end of 1996 
raions had received between 59% and 68% of their planned transfer allocation.
I asked whether the oblast could implement its own transfer system on the basis 
of its own funds, and the answer was perhaps obvious: in principle of course it 
could, but in practice it doesn’t have the money. Given lack of local funds, it sees 
the best way to distribute federal transfers as to pass them on to the raions. 
especially given that their stated purpose is equalization (although there is no federal 
obligation or even assumption that they will be passed on). However, in 1997 the 
Oblast Administration did implement an additional system of ‘subventions’ for the 
first time. These are to come out of the oblast budget and to be given to raions to 
cover the ‘protected items’ in their budget: wages, meals and medicine. ( ‘Protected 
items’ are items given top priority by federal authorities. They must be covered 
before other expenditures, and planned spending on them cannot in principle be 
reduced even in the event of a budget shortfall.) The introduction of the subventions 
is seen as a way for the oblast to ensure that all raions are able to cover essential 
items as quickly as possible even if federal transfers are delayed. This should reduce, 
for example, the incidence of wage arrears, a huge problem in many regions and one 
which regional authorities often blame on delays in federal transfers. Under this new 
system, transfers will be worked out in the usual way, but with receipts from 
subventions included in a raion’s ‘pre-transfer’ revenues.
3.2.4 The impact of the transfer system
Several criticisms of this transfer system are possible, even putting aside the 
instability of the financing source and the insufficiency of funds. The most obvious is 
the use of the ‘minimum budget’ as a proxy for expenditure needs, where the 
minimum budget is based on the level of spending in a previous year. As discussed 
above, in most countries formula mechanisms to determine equalizing grants are 
based on direct indicators of need (population, area, number of school-children etc). 
Though far from being an exact science, this seems a more reasonable starting point: 
why after all would past expenditure levels be a good proxy of current needs? The 
mechanism implies great trust in the equality of the old system; but the key 
motivation behind its use in Russia appears to be more inertia than belief in the 
allocative justice of the Soviet era. Several people I spoke to in the Novgorod Oblast 
Adminstration felt that the system was unfair and should be replaced, but argued that 
it was imposed on them by federal law. This is true — although it is not clear how far 




























































































laws are happily bent. For the moment though it seems likely that it is a system used 
as standard right across the country.
Whatever the rights and wrongs of the minimum budget, however, a look at the 
Novgorod budget for 1996 shows that in practice the system’s impact is 
considerable. Table 7 gives summary statistics for average pre- and post-transfer 
revenues per capita and actual per capita expenditures. The first column gives 
revenues per capita as raised and retained in the raion. Disparities are considerable, 
with an almost six-fold difference between the lowest and highest revenue raions. 
Many of the lower revenue raions -- Moshenskoi, Volotovsky, Marevsky, 
Poddorsky — are small rural raions with no industry. In the past the local economy 
was based around the collective farm, but the majority of these have now collapsed 
into private plots run for subsistence or very small scale private sale. At the other 
extreme, Novgorod City and Chudova have been the only direct beneficiaries of all 
recent foreign investment.
Table 7. Summary statistics for pre- and post-transfer revenues and total 











Minimum 238 397 916 993 947
Maximum 1,367 1,451 1,583 1587 1,736
Mean 619 844 1,265 1,294 1,322
Max/Min ratio 5.7 3.7 1.7 1.6 1.8
90/10 decile ratio 3.2 2.1 1.6 1.5 1.7
Coefficient of 
Variation 0.40 0.28 0.16 0.14 0.17
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the Finance Committee of Novgorod Oblast 
Admin. Note: Each raion is weighted by its population for the calculation of decile ratios and 
coefficients of variation.
Transfers however have a dramatic impact on the distribution. The second 
column of the table shows per capita revenues including mutual settlements and 
dotations (i.e. transfers made not for equalizing purposes but to fulfil commitments 
made from higher levels of government or to cover newly devolved responsibilities). 
The third column shows the latter plus the equalizing transfers made according to the 
formula outlined above. Disparities are sharply reduced at both the dotation stage 
and the ‘transfer’ stage, as reflected in each of the measures of inequality given at 




























































































Finally, the fourth column of the table gives total per capita expenditures by 
raion, which includes any subsidies and credits made to the raion. Expenditures 
appear to be slightly more evenly distributed than total revenues. The upshot is that 
while the highest revenue raion raised 5.7 times more than the lowest in own 
revenues, the highest spending raion spent just 1.6 times more overall than the 
lowest. As a comparison, in 1995 the highest revenue oblast in European Russia 
raised 9.6 times more than the lowest, while the highest spending oblast spent 5.2 
times more.17 The coefficient of variation for this group of oblasts came down from 
0.47 for own-revenues to 0.42 for expenditures. The scale of initial disparity is 
therefore much smaller at the sub-oblast level, but the equalization mechanism inside 
Novgorod also appears to be considerably more effective than the inter-oblast 
mechanism.
In addition, final raion expenditure levels in Novgorod appear to be dictated 
slightly more if anything by the level of the minimum budget than by initial own 
revenues: correlation between total expenditures and own revenues is 0.68; between 
total expenditures and the minimum budget 0.75. While these correlations are not 
significantly different, the relative importance of the two factors varies depending on 
the level of own revenues, as the scatterplot in Figure 1 illustrates. It seems that 
having high pre-transfer revenues per capita will ensure high per capita expenditures, 
but that low revenue raions are not necessarily condemned to the lowest levels of 
spending, thanks to the transfer mechanism. Among the bottom half of the 
expenditure distribution, the minimum budget is a more important determinant of 
spending than own revenues.
3.3 A summary
This part of the paper had three main aims: first, to establish the extent of raion 
expenditure responsibilities; second to explore the mechanisms that exist to ensure 
that raions have the revenues they need to meet these responsibilities; and third, to 
determine how far the revenue system is dictated by federal law and how far 
arrangements might differ across oblasts.
The first question is straightforward. The raions of Novogorod Oblast are now 
responsible for some 60% of oblast expenditure, or nearly 30% of consolidated 
expenditure in the oblast. In the education sector, they are in charge of all pre-school 
and school institutions, which means 95% of oblast education spending or 80% of all
17 These figures are calculated for the 35 oblasts of the North-West, Central, Central Black Earth, 
Volga and Volga Vyatskiy Regions. The North Caucasus, Siberia and the Far North and Far East 





























































































Scatterplot showing raion expenditure per capita against pre­
transfer revenues and minimum expenditure per capita
spending on education. Furthermore, analysis of the revenue system shows that 
raions have real responsibility for these services: their role is not just to pass on 
earmarked funding from above. While they have only limited ability to affect the size 
of their budgets, they do have full control over allocation: even grants received from 
higher levels of government are general and can be spent freely. There are of course 
a number of federal regulations on minimum expenditure levels: those that affect 
education will be described in Section 4.
In answer to the second question, it turns out that fairly powerful mechanisms 
exist to ensure that even less well-off raions can meet their responsibilities. 
Equalization transfers bring the ratio of per capita budget revenue in the highest and 
lowest revenue regions down from 3.7 to 1.7 and the coefficient of variation down 
from 0.28 to 0.16. The level of post-transfer revenue disparity within Novgorod 
Oblast is hence much lower than that between the oblasts of European Russia, where 
the ratio of maximum to minimum for 1995 was 5.2. The degree of disparity in 
expenditures per capita in Novgorod is actually lower than that in the minimum 
budgets calculated as essential for each raion.
One very interesting aspect of the Novgorod transfer system, however, is the fact 
that the degree of support to poorer raions depends entirely on the level of oblast 
receipts from the federal transfer fund. This brings us on to the third question: how 




























































































other oblasts too? Many of the basic characteristics of the system are laid down in 
federal law and as such are likely to hold for all oblasts: most importantly, federal 
law requires that oblasts have a system of transfers which ensures that all raions can 
cover a ‘minimum budget’, and also states that this budget should be calculated on 
the basis of last year’s spending levels, adjusted for various relevant changes since 
then. However, there are no requirements (or guidelines) on where the funds to 
cover these transfers are to come from.
If the Novgorod system is universal, it raises an interesting question. The system 
implies that, despite federal law, the degree of equalization achieved depends on the 
sum of federal funds -- indeed, actual transfers made were considerably less than 
intended in Novgorod in 1996 because transfers from the centre fell below plan. If 
other regions do things in the same way, poorer regions (those receiving more) will 
have stronger redistribution systems. The fact that Novgorod is poor and receives a 
relatively large sum in transfers from the federal support fund is what allows it to 
achieve such a high degree of equalization. In 1995 19% of Novgorod Oblast’s total 
budget revenues came from the federal support fund, compared to a regional average 
of 8%: does this mean that Novgorod redistributed 19% of its revenue while the 
average region redistributed only 8%? The extreme cases are the donor regions, 
those receiving no federal transfers: do they have an internal redistribution system at 
all?
The last possibility seems unlikely, and the fact that Novgorod itself has 
introduced a second transfer mechanism to cover protected items is evidence that 
regions can and do have the initiative to set up their own systems from scratch. But 
this leads to a second question for the donor regions. Novogorod does its best to 
follow federal law in bringing each raion as close as possible to a minimum revenue 
level. In practice every raion ends up qualifying for transfers: even Novgorod City 
and Chudovsky, once they have submitted their allotted tax shares to the oblast 
budget, fall below their minimum budgets on the basis of their own revenues. The 
point is that while Novgorod is doing a good job, what it is doing is (of necessity) a 
minimum. Would more distribution take place if the oblast had resources sufficient 
to do more than the minimum? With a basic revenue level assured for all raions (and 
the requirements of federal law satisfied) it would be interesting to know whether 
equalization would continue or whether some areas would pull ahead. In the 




























































































4. Financing education in Novgorod Oblast
This part of the paper concentrates on the financing of the education sector in 
Novgorod. The focus is on disparities in education finance across the oblast’s raions, 
but the analysis is broader in two senses. First, it begins by trying to give some idea 
of the way in which decisions are made, and the incentives and constraints involved 
at different levels. And second, it also looks briefly at evidence on other aspects of 
inequality, in particular the urban-rural split, and the differences in opportunities 
facing individual children living in the same area. The focus on finance does not 
reflect a belief that education finance is synonomous with quality of educational 
provision; just that (at least in a context of severe cutbacks) the first is likely to have 
an important impact on the second, while also being a straightforward measure and 
one which adjusts immediately to new conditions.
In the first sub-section below, I clarify the division of education expenditure 
responsibilities by government level, and discuss the degree to which the local level 
is really free to make its own decisions. I look at the formal constraints faced by 
raion authorities, and also at the informal framework of precedents and incentives 
within which they make their decisions. In practice, budget allocation decisions are 
much more uniform than the system formally requires, and it is the reason for this 
that interests me here. The next sub-section explores the evidence on disparities in 
total raion education spending. It asks how far these seem to be explained by 
financial constraint and necessity, and how far by raion choice about priorities. 
Section 4.3 looks at how funding is allocated within the education budget, both by 
item and between different institutions, and asks in particular whether raions differ in 
the priority that they give to kindergartens, given that there is somewhat less 
compunction to provide these than to provide compulsory schools. Section 4.4 asks 
whether there seems to be an urban-rural split in education provision, looking at 
what evidence there is on non-monetary measures of education provision. Finally, 
Section 4.5 looks at the role of non-budgetary sources of finance, including the 
importance of private schools and of private financing of public schools.
4.1 Background: responsibilities, constraints and incentives
In principle the raions in Novgorod have full control over current expenditure on all 
pre-schools and general schools, including (since 1996) correctional boarding 
schools and schools for children with special needs. There are one or two exceptions 
in practice, of which textbooks are the main one. The oblast authorities continue to 
provide textbooks (to the extent that they are provided at all) to all raions except 
Novgorod City, which chooses to provide its own. This is a responsibility which the 




























































































themselves. For the same reason, the oblast authorities told me that they fund 
teachers’ holiday pay. Capital repairs are the raion responsibility, but capital 
construction comes from the oblast budget. In practice construction is virtually non­
existent for the moment, and what little there is shows up as an expenditure in the 
raion budget: the funds appear to be transferred from oblast to raion as part of 
mutual settlements or dotations. Aside from the items already mentioned, the oblast 
education budget covers only general educational development programmes, teacher 
training, (voluntary) assistance to Novgorod State University, and as of January 
1997 the 25 technical-vocational institutions in the area. Previously these were 
federal responsibility but the oblast has opted to take over control. The federal 
budget is responsible for the university.
How far does raion autonomy over education spending reach in reality? There are 
basically five constraints on raion authorities. One has already been discussed above 
— the raion’s limited ability to adjust tax rates to raise extra revenues if it wishes to. 
However, the fact that all transfers from the oblast are lump sum and unconditional 
means that at least within the limits of its budget the raion is free to spend money as 
it chooses. This is with four provisos which apply specifically to education. First, 
under federal law the raion must ensure that all children have access to free (non­
paying) education at primary and secondary level, where this covers as a minimum 
the subjects included in the basic curriculum.18 Second, there are maximum limits on 
class sizes for each age group, implying minimums on teacher numbers. Third, these 
teachers must be paid at least the salary level set as a minimum in Moscow, and 
increased by the oblast authorities if they so choose. Finally, the raion must cover 
‘protected items’ before any others. In education, the only significant item here is the 
wage bill. The other protected items are food (a minimum per pupil expenditure, 
which is negligible — 1,200 roubles per child per month, enough for half a loaf of 
bread), and medicines (an even tinier sum). Aside from these limits the raion’s hand 
is free to allocate the education budget as it chooses, and indeed to determine the 
education budget’s size. It can take funds away from other activities to spend on 
education, or it can take funds away from education and spend them on other things.
The combination of minimum teacher numbers and minimum salaries might seem 
quite a severe restriction on what the raion can do, but it is worth noting that in 
practice the limits on teacher numbers at least are unlikely to change anything in how 
the education budget is run by the raion. I did not hear any complaints at oblast or 
raion level about being forced to hire too many teachers: at all levels the recent rise
18 Russian Federation Federal Law On Education, Accepted by the State Duma 12 July 1995 and 
approved by the Federation Council 5 January 1996; further referred to as ‘Federal Law on 




























































































in teacher numbers was defended on grounds of need (higher pupil numbers in 
genera] and particularly at secondary level). What 1 was told about this in Shimsk 
Raion matched exactly what I was told in the federal Ministry of Education three 
months earlier.19 There were complaints from the oblast about salary limits, but more 
out of principle than a belief that wages were actually too high. The Oblast 
Administration pointed to the irrationality of having one government level decide on 
the wage level while another pays the wages, but nobody suggested that teachers’ 
wages had been pushed too high by federal decree, nor that they were being forced 
by federal law to spend too large a proportion of the budget on wages. As context it 
is worth noting that in 1995 the average wage in education was 72% of the overall 
average in Novgorod, compared to 85% in 1991; while at the beginning of 1997 the 
average teacher’s wage was under 400,000 roubles a month ($70), with textbooks 
retailing for up to 100,000 roubles each. While the ability of the centre to set a floor 
for the wage might seem odd, in the light of these figures one could look at it as the 
imposition of a minimum wage, which is widely accepted as a right of central 
government. Note that in principle at least the federal level should in any case foot 
the bill for any mandated salary increases through ‘mutual settlements’ (see above), 
although there are continual complaints from the regions that these are non­
transparent and insufficient.20
Yet however constrained raions may be by these regulations, I was interested to 
discover that the uniformity of the budgeting process far exceeds their limits. There 
seem to be two different reasons for this. The first is inertia and lack of innovation in 
the budget allocation system. Despite the fact that each raion is free to determine the 
education budget in the way it chooses,21 all three raions I visited did it in the same 
way — on the basis of last year’s budgets, with adjustments made for changes in 
pupil numbers after negotiations between raion finance department and raion 
education department. The same was also apparently true of the way in which 
funding was allocated by raion education departments to schools and kindergartens. 
In essence, this is a reproduction of the principle behind the calculation of the raion 
‘minimum budget’ discussed in Section 3.
19 Meeting with V.V.Grachev, Head of Department of Statistics, Ministry of General and 
Professional Education (MGPE), Moscow, April 15th 1997.
20 V. Bolotov, Vice Deputy Minister, MGPE, acknowledged lack of transparency to be a problem 
with these payments at the OECD Review of Education Policy in the RF (Moscow, June 16-17 
1997). He said it was completely unclear why one region got one sum to cover wage arrears and 
another a different sum.
21 Article 31 of the Federal Law on Education explicitly notes the right of the raion to ‘develop 




























































































Naturally there are both efficiency (incentive) and equity implications of such a 
system. It is inefficient as those making spending decisions have no real incentive to 
economize as this will just result in a smaller budget for next year. The rational 
course of action for both the raion education department and the individual school is 
to keep requesting more funding and then spending it whether it is needed or not. In 
the current context of severe shortage of resources this may not be a very important 
consideration: there are always many more ways in which money can usefully be 
spent, and so institutions and local budget departments have clear incentives to 
prioritize expenditure. For the moment the equity implications may be more 
worrying. In each of the three raions I visited, and at the oblast level, it was openly 
acknowledged that the system was outdated and inaccurate, with past expenditure 
levels bearing little obvious relation to current need. At the same time the lack of 
transparency of the system and the room it allows for negotiation may add to 
inequality as it may mean that schools which are better at bargaining or which have 
friendlier relations with the raion authorities receive more than others.
Why do local authorities stick with this allocation system, if they recognize its 
faults? At each level of government there seemed to be a desire to change the 
system, but also a feeling that no change could realistically be made unless it came 
down from the centre. At raion level, redesigning financing norms appears simply to 
be too big a job, one which it would not make sense for them to take on. They are 
waiting for the initiative to come from the oblast, which has a policy role even if it 
has no coercive power over any raion. At the oblast level, work has in fact begun on 
a new system which would use a per-pupil type formula to allocate funds, and 
several people I spoke to were enthusiastic about it.22 The obstacle here seems to 
come from Oblast Duma deputies who have been persuaded of the convenience of 
the non-transparent system, which allows criteria to remain cloudy and prevents any 
school from being able to stake an absolute claim to a certain sum. The Oblast Duma 
has apparently said it would refuse to adopt any new system unless it was first 
adopted at the federal level.
A second factor driving uniformity, however, is the fact that actual budgetary 
resources are limited, unstable and always below plan. Funds reach both raion 
education budgets and schools in trickles throughout the year, which means that in 
practice by the time they arrive they are already earmarked: they go to pay the most 
urgent arrears, be it salaries or heating bills. This means raions have no chance of 
making any policy decisions about how to spend funds, and may be one of the
22 This is currently one of two main policy concerns of the Oblast Education Committee. The other 




























































































reasons behind the failure to develop new financing norms: what would be the point? 
This is explored further in Section 4.3 below.
One further aspect of the financing system is worth highlighting. Under the 
traditional allocation mechanism, not only was a school’s funding for this year based 
on its expenditure last year, but in addition the school never got to see what this 
allocation was. All local school funds were handled by a single accountancy office 
for each raion. While in principle these accountants knew how much funding a 
school was entitled to and were supposed to ensure that by the end of the year they 
hadn’t received more (or less?), the school director was not aware of how much 
his/her school was allocated. Each time there was a need for a new expenditure (a 
light bulb, some teacher overtime, new chairs) the school director went to the central 
accountant and made a request for funds. The accountant could accept, or reject on 
the grounds that the school had used up its share of resources. Such a murky 
financing arrangement clearly gave the school director very little incentive to keep 
costs down or to prioritize spending. It also confused the issue of accountability. If a 
teacher was not paid it was not theoretically the school director’s responsibility but 
that of the central accountant. But as the accountant paid wages via the director, the 
money could get lost along the route.
In Novgorod this is an aspect of the financing system which the Oblast Education 
Committee has been keen to address, giving it top priority alongside the goal of per- 
pupil financing. In this case they have been much more successful in implementation, 
apparently because they have federal law on their side: the Federal Law on 
Education gave the school the right to its own independent budget and the school 
director full control over how it is spent.23 As of July 1997 budget autonomy had 
been delegated to almost 40% of schools in Novgorod Oblast, and the aim was to 
reach 50% by the end of the year. Funds to these schools are still negotiated on the 
basis of past expenditure levels, but once agreed on the sum is transferred into an 
independent bank account upon which only the school director can draw. The 
authorities argue that budget autonomy will give school directors more incentive to 
control costs and to prioritize, as the buck now stops with them. According to raion 
officials, school directors did not universally jump at the chance to control their own 
budgets; many of them seem to have been quite content with having no 
responsibility. But as they are appointed and dismissed by the raion authorities they 
do not have much choice. The determinant of whether a school will have an 
independent budget is what the raion thinks of the policy: in those raions in favour, 
most or all schools have now moved over; while in other raions the policy has not 
yet taken off at all. The oblast has no power to force raions to comply.




























































































Despite the fact that school budget autonomy is now federal law, Novgorod 
appears to be unusual in putting it into practice. A recent Ministry of Education 
officials claimed that schools had no budget autonomy as recently as April 1997,24 
while at a Novgorod conference to discuss oblast education policy with 
neighbouring Leningradskaya Oblast in June 1997,25 the Leningrad delegates heavily 
criticized the idea of greater decentralization. They argued that it would increase 
injustice in the system as it was not possible to predict in advance where 
expenditures would be most needed, in effect claiming an equity justification for the 
non-transparent process run by the all-powerful central accountant. They also 
maintained that it was pointless to concentrate energy (and money, as school 
directors have to be retrained) on a process which will not affect the basic problem 
the system faces, lack of funds. The Novgorod delegates refused to accept that there 
were implications for equity, while arguing that the new system would not only mean 
more efficient use of funds, but would also lead to an increase in the total available, 
as there would be more incentive for school directors to raise their own additional 
funds. 1 go into this in more detail in Section 4.5 below. In practice this impact on 
fund-raising activity is likely to be the main effect of the move to independent school 
budgets in the immediate term. Ability to determine the direction of budgetary 
resources has even less real meaning for the moment for schools than for raions, 
because of the context of shortage of funds. In practice funds reach both raion 
budgets and school budgets already earmarked, as will become clear below.
4.2. Raion disparities in education finance
How large then are disparities across the oblast in education financing, and how do 
they compare to disparities in other sectors? Figure 2 shows the ratio between the 
highest spending and lowest spending raions in various sectors, and that between the 
third raion from top and third from bottom (to get rid of outliers). Expenditure 
includes capital spending (insofar as there is any) and is measured per capita, except 
for education expenditure which is measured per person under twenty (a category
2J Meeting with G.V.Bashkina, Deputy Head of Department of Economics in the MGPE, 
Moscow, April 18th 1997. A recent note on the direction of education reform prepared by several 
Deputy Ministers claims that fewer than 10% of Russian secondary schools have their own 
accounts. (‘On Objectives and Directions of the Education Reform in Russia (Analytical Note)’, 
draft proposal prepared by Deputy Ministers Tichonov, Asmolov, Dmitriev (Ministry of Labour), 
Summer 1997.)





























































































imposed by the population data: in fact pupils move onto higher education — and 
therefore out of the raion’s sphere of responsibility — at seventeen or eighteen).26
Figure 2
Measures of disparity in raion expenditure, by raion
Expenditure category
The raion spending most on education spends about 80% more per child than the 
lowest spender, and the third highest 50% more than the third lowest. As the figure 
shows, this is a level of difference very similar to that for total expenditure and for 
the sum of social expenditure, but considerably lower than for other spending 
categories, among them other social categories such as health and social policy.27 It 
looks as though education is being protected better than other spheres. The fact that 
the sum of all expenditure shows roughly the same level of disparity as education is 
strange, however, given the much greater disparity in other categories. This is 
particularly so as ‘national economy’ (mostly spending on housing) takes up a large 
share of the total raion budget — 35% on average compared to just under 30% on 
education. One explanation may be that all raions give education the same priority -- 
the basics cannot be cut — whereas other spheres are valued differently in different 
areas. Finally, it is worth noting that the scale of disparity observed here in all 
sectors is much lower than that between oblasts. The highest per capita level of
26 The difference in results if education expenditure is measured per capita as opposed to per child 
is minimal.
27 However, health expenditure is difficult to interpret because of the growing importance of the 




























































































expenditure in European Russia in 1995 was over five times greater than the lowest 
level; while per child spending on education varied by a factor of 2.6.28
All the same, an 80% difference in per child education spending is not 
inconsiderable. The highest spending raion, Borovichsky, borders the lowest 
spending, Okhulovsky: it appears that a school in one village could be enjoying 
almost twice the funding per child as a school in a neighbouring village. Given the 
importance played by the ‘minimum budget’ in determining raion revenues, 
however, it is plausible that some of this difference results from differences in 
provision costs. Fixed costs mean that raions with fewer children or a more scattered 
population are likely to have to spend more per child on education, and if this was 
taken into account in the Soviet allocation mechanism it would also affect revenue 
allocations now. Table 8 shows the results of some simple OLS regressions which 
aim to measure the impact of revenue on education spending if these cost factors are 
held constant. It is striking that while budget revenue seems to explain about 60% of 
variation in education spending, the two control factors have almost no impact. The 
share of the rural population has no bearing at all on the sum spent per child, while 
slightly more is spent per child in raions with a smaller total number of children. 
However, neither of these factors diminish the size or significance of the revenue
Table 8. Results o f OLS regressions for per child education expenditure (th. roubles 
per child)___________________________________________________________
Budget Rev Budget Rev No. o f  Rural pop Constant R2 
per child per child SQ 'D children (%)
(1000 rubles) (1000 rubles)
1 0.23 353.7 0.59 
(5.6) (1.7)
2 0.25 -0.004 285.1 0.61 
(6.0) (-1.6) (1.4)
3 0.25 -0.003 0.15 274.4 0.60 
(5.8) (-1.2) (0.1) (1.2)
4 0.000022 921.1 0.60 
(5.7) (8.7)
5 0.000024 -0.004 900.6 0.63 
(6.1) (-1.6) (8.8)
Note. T statistics are given in brackets.
28 Figures calculated for the 35 oblasts of the North-West, Central, Central Black Earth, Volga 
and Volga Vyatskiy Regions. The North Caucasus, Siberia and the Far North and Far East were 




























































































variable.29 Revenues appear to have a very slightly non-linear relationship with 
education spending, a greater share of each extra rouble going to education as 
revenue rises.
This still leaves over one-third of the variation explained by neither budget 
revenue nor (apparently) higher provision costs. This suggests an element of choice 
in raion budget allocation, a possibility supported by the variation in the percentage 
of the raion budget spent on education: variation is between 24 and 37% of the total, 
and none of this disparity is explained by the percentage of the population which is 
of school age (the correlation between the two series is 0.02). Furthermore, and 
consistent with the significant quadratic term in the regressions, the share of 
education in the budget is positively correlated (0.34) with per child rouble 
expenditure: that is, raions spending more on education are spending a higher share 
of their budgets on education, conflicting with the idea that they simply have more to 
spend.
Care has to be taken, however, in interpreting expenditure disparities on the basis 
of data from a single year. On the one hand, the differences could represent a long 
term trend in which some raions spend more than others. But another explanation is 
that they represent one-off financing of urgent repairs in particular raions. In a 
situation in which funds are extremely limited, the replacement of a school roof in 
one raion could affect the relative expenditure figures.30 More seriously, perhaps, 
financing of these one-off items might explain not only part of the variation in 
education expenditure not explained by variation in revenue, but also some of the 
variation in revenue itself. This is because the oblast has more discretion over 
revenue allocation in practice than appears to be the case in theory. This is primarily 
due to the haphazard and piecemeal nature of financing, which is received and 
allocated bit by bit, with some never received at all (executed revenues tending to 
fall short of planned revenues). This forces the oblast to engage in a degree of 
prioritizing. As noted in Section 3, allocation of official oblast transfers to raions 
varied between 59 and 68% of their planned level in 1996. How did the oblast 
determine which raions should be given precedence? In essence the rule appears to 
be simply that the most urgent requests are met first. Protected items take priority, 
followed by essential repairs. So once all raions are able to cover wages, food and 
medicine, a raion with a school with a collapsed roof would be first in line to receive
"9 In a separate regression, it was established that none of the variation in budget revenue per child 
could be explained by the number of children in the raion or the rural population share, so if these 
factors do affect the minimum budget the impact is negligible.
30 This was in fact a point made to me in Shimsk Raion, about disparities in raion funding to 





























































































its share of transfers. A second mechanism open to the oblast is the oblast reserve 
fund, through which loans are made in emergency cases. Again, prioritizing seems to 
take place along the same lines.
The point is that there may be some element of reverse causation: a raion may 
have higher revenues and therefore higher education expenditure not just because of 
its minimum budget (leading to a greater allocation of transfers) but because it has 
gone to the oblast with an urgent expenditure item which cannot be put off (so it 
receives a greater share of its allocation). Unfortunately, without a series of data 
over time, it is hard to know whether an oblast spending money on repairs is doing 
so because it has the money or has the money because it is doing so. Even data 
showing the breakdown of expenditure by item (which is presented in Section 4.3.1 
below) cannot help to answer this. However, I was given the raion plans for 
expenditure for 1996, and hoped that this might shed light on the matter: if it is true 
that prioritizing on the basis of emergency need is important, planned expenditures 
should show much less disparity than executed expenditure.
It turns out to be true that planned expenditure figures show less inter-raion 
variation than the executed figures, although only slightly less: the ratio of maximum 
to minimum is 1.68 (compared to 1.78) and the ratio of third highest to third lowest 
1.35 (compared to 1.46). However, two points are interesting. First, no raion spends 
more than 100% of its plan, although this does not of course mean that there was no 
emergency expenditure, just that what there was displaced other planned education 
sector spending. More surprising is the fact that planned education expenditure is 
very badly explained by planned revenues, with a correlation of 0.17 (compared to 
0.78 between actual revenues and actual education spending). Indeed, if the OLS 
regressions in Table 8 are run using planned revenue and expenditure figures, the 
only variable significant is the percentage of the population which is rural, as shown 
in Table 9. A higher rural population seems to mean a raion will plan to spend more 
per child on education (although, as we have seen, this factor is irrelevant in 
determining what is actually spent by the end of the year).
Table 9. OLS regression results for planned education expenditure (thousand
Planned budget 
rev per child 
(1000 rubles)
No. o f children Rural pop
(%)
Constant R2
1 0.03 0.0 4.3 1398.1 0.20




























































































Why are planned revenues so unimportant in determining planned education 
expenditure, while executed budget revenue is the driving factor behind actual 
education spending? One possible explanation of this is that planned education 
expenditure is planned at the lowest essential level, regardless of planned revenue. 
Raions have to spend a certain basic amount per child (a bit more per child in rural 
areas) to keep the schools running. With this covered, they cannot afford to plan 
more as there are numerous other services that need attention, which is why 
education spending bears no relation to revenues in the plan. In practice however 
what happens is that executed revenues fall way below plan (on average actual raion 
revenues were some 70% of the plan for 1996), so that only the real necessities can 
be covered, of which education is one. The result is that education spending falls 
only a little below plan (as can be seen below in Table 10) compared to spending in 
other sectors which fall considerably under; while education spending also ends by 
being closely related to actual budget revenues, as it is one of the areas on which 
revenue is spent as it comes in. This story is consistent with the idea of higher raion 
revenues being explained by greater need, as suggested above. Although clearly not 
conclusive, it supports the idea that it would be unwise to attribute too much 
significance to the disparities in budget spending on education noted. This was 
backed up by what 1 was told within the oblast: the overriding problem as seen from 
the ground is not differences in the funds available to different raions, but a shortage 
of funds which affects everyone. Some more evidence for this is presented in the 
next section.
4.3 Allocating resources within the education budget
4.3.1 Allocation by item
Once the raion education committee has its budget, in theory it is free to determine 
allocation as it wishes, both to different institutions and on different items, provided 
it covers protected items first. As already implied however, financial reality imposes 
sharp constraints on the decision-making process. Even the money for protected 
items comes in in trickles during the year: several raions had wage arrears in July 
1997 dating back two or three months. After these items, attention can be turned to 
maintenance of the buildings and urgent repairs. The officials I spoke to claimed that 
once protected items were covered there was very little money left, and that the 
direction of what there was dictated by the urgency of repairs.
There are two illustrations of the tight situation in which the education budget 
finds itself. First, as noted above, actual raion revenues averaged some 70% of 
planned revenues, resulting in cuts across the board in a budget already considered 




























































































budget as planned. All sectors end up spending less than had been planned, some 
substantially less. The education sector fares less badly than many.





Total expenditure 71 Total social expenditure 77
Administration 97 Education 85
Law enforcement 83 Health 67
Industry 67 Social policy 73
Agriculture 68 Physical culture 99
Transport 57 Culture 77
Market infrastructure 46 Housing 61
Environment 70 Mass media 90
The second indication is the breakdown of raion education expenditure by item. 
What is of particular interest is the amount of money spent on non-protected items 
(equipment and textbooks), and the amount spent on capital repairs. Unfortunately 1 
was only able to gather the former from two raions, Novgorod City and Shimsk 
Raion. This data is somewhat sketchy and hard to match up with what 1 received 
from the oblast authorities, but it supports the idea that sums spent on equipment and 
supplies are small. In Novgorod the equivalent of some 10% of what was spent on 
teacher salaries in general schools (excluding wage funds) is recorded as having 
been spent on textbooks, with an extra 4% on equipment and ‘soft supplies’ 
(stationery etc.). In the rural raion of Shimsk just 4% of the wage bill was spent on 
these categories together.
The other interesting question is what has happened to capital expenditure. As a 
share of total expenditure, the amount spent on capital repairs was in no raion 
greater than two percent, with six of the 22 raions spending nothing. Variation in 
capital construction was higher, but largely because of one raion, Khvoininsky, 
where a new school was built. In Khvoininsky 16% of the total education budget 
went on construction, but everywhere else construction expenditure varied bewteen 
zero and three percent of the total, with the majority of raions (fourteen) spending 
nothing. The bigger towns tend to have done slightly better than average with 
respect to capital spending, with Chudova spending 5.1% on capital repairs and 
construction, Novgorod City 1.8% and Borovich 2.4%. Khvoininsky is a smallish 
raion with no outstanding characteristics other than a 53% increase in the number of 




























































































have risen 20% over this period). The new school is the result of an oblast level 
decision and is the first school to be built in the oblast for five years. Previously the 
policy was to finance one new school in each raion every year.
One odd thing about the low levels of expenditure on equipment and repairs is 
that data on protected items (wages, food and medical supplies) show a much lower 
share of expenditure on wage items than is normal by international standards. The 
wage share varies between 35% and 55%, excluding payments to the wage funds; if 
those were included the sum would be more like 45% and 70% (assuming the wage 
funds to be roughly 25% of the wage bill). In Britain around 70% of current account 
spending goes on teacher salaries (MacKinnon and Statham, 1995, p. 139), while in 
less developed countries the percentage can reach 80 or 90% (Mingaat and Tan, 
1992, cited in Klugman, 1997). Clearly low wages are keeping the wage bill down 
despite high teacher numbers. An extra five to ten percent of the budget is spent on 
food, while medical supplies are so small as to be invisible in most areas. This 
suggests that a relatively large amount is left over for other items. However, utility 
bills are likely to take up the bulk of this. I did not obtain separate data on 
expenditures on utilities, but these have become substantial in recent years with the 
lifting of price controls.31
4.3.2 Allocation between institutions, and the impact on pre-schools in 
particular
The conventional method of allocating funds from the raion budget to school 
institutions has been described in Section 4.1 above. I explained there that, while 
raion authorities are free to develop their own local mechanisms for allocating funds 
to schools,32 in practice raions seem to follow the same method; basing this year’s 
allocation on last year’s, with adjustment made for changes in the contingent of 
children. Whatever the arguments for and against this method, one effect of it should 
be that the distribution of funds across education levels remains fairly constant over 
time. This was the response in Novgorod when I asked if the financing of 
kindergartens had deteriorated relative to that of general schools in recent years. I 
had wondered whether, given the lesser obligation on raions to provide pre-school 
education (in part because of its non-compulsory nature and in part because the law
31 At the OECD Review of Education Policy in the RF, G. Bashkina (Deputy Head of the 
Department of Economics in the MGPE) claimed that huge tariffs were now paid for utilities and 
that these took up the lion’s share of funds allocated to schools (Moscow, June 16-17 1997).
32 Federal Law on Education, Article 31. Article 41 suggests that there are federal minimum norms 




























































































gives it slightly less protection33), they were taking the obvious step of squeezing 
pre-schools to support compulsory schools. But I was told at both oblast and raion 
levels that pre-school institutions were treated just the same in the allocation process 
as other institutions, and that while all levels of education had suffered, cuts had 
been inflicted on all levels fairly evenly.
In practice, however, the pre-school level overall is clearly receiving a smaller 
share of the total than previously, simply because more and more kindergartens have 
closed down. In 1996 there were 410 kindergartens in operation, compared to 513 
five years earlier. (These figures include both municipal and enterprise 
kindergartens: all but a handful of enterprise kindergartens have now been divested 
to the raion authorities.) Closures are in part due to falling fertility rates, but 
enrolment levels have also fallen: in January 1990 the percentage of children aged 
between one and six (inclusive) attending kindergarten varied across raions between 
84% and 50%, by January 1997 the maximum was 74% and the minimum just 28%. 
Overall enrolment in the oblast has fallen from 71% to 56% of this age-group. 
Demand factors still seem to be the direct cause; supply of kindergarten places now 
outstrips demand for the first time in the Oblast Administration's memory. Both 
rising unemployment and the cost of attendance are likely to be encouraging parents 
to keep their children at home: under federal regulations kindergartens can charge 
parents up to 20% of the average cost of a child’s place, and may also demand 
assistance in kind, as explained below.34 The cost of a child’s place is an 
indeterminate concept, but the rule seems to be interpreted to mean that the 
kindergarten can use fees to raise up to 20% of what it spends.
Yet while demand factors may be the direct reason for closures, the supply side 
policies followed by the raion can themselves affect demand. In particular, raions 
can influence the level of charges in their local kindergartens. Although the amount 
to charge is a decision made by the institution, the raion can offer to cover part of the 
fee itself as an additional payment to the kindergarten, keeping the charge to parents 
down if pre-school education is considered a priority. I was told that in practice fees 
charged vary across the oblast between 6% and 12% of the provision cost. One 
raion, Staraya Russa, was held up as a shining example by the kindergarten experts 
in the Oblast Administration: the kindergartens there charge 2,000 roubles a day 
against the average charge of 3,000 roubles, and Staraya Russa — about average in 
terms of education spending per capita — has an enrolment rate of 72%, second only
33 Federal Law on Education, Articles 5 and 18. Article 18 states that a network of pre-school 
institutions exist to help with the upbringing of young children, and guarantees access to these 
institutions to all sectors of society, but Article 5 on the child’s right to education does not 
mention pre-school.




























































































to Novgorod City. Note that 3,000 roubles a day makes 60,000 roubles a month, 
compared to an average per capita income in December 1996 of 832.00035: i.e„ not 
an impossible amount, but a sizeable chunk of average income. Demand is bound to 
be price-elastic at these prices. (In addition to the fee there may be other hidden 
costs, as explored in Section 4.5 below.)36
Despite the apparently standard allocation mechanism, it seems then that 
raions can and do exercise influence over the relative position of pre-school 
institutions, and naturally individuals will have different priorities about where 
money should be spent. This was underlined for me at the conference on educational 
policy mentioned above. One Novgorod raion was praised by the kindergarten lobby 
for having succeeded in increasing its enrolment rate over the last few years against 
the trend. The Chair of the Education Committee responded that that particular raion 
also had among the worst records on teacher wage arrears. It was clear which he 
thought more important. It is likely then that some raions are indeed squeezing 
kindergartens to try to soften the difficult conditions facing other schools.
4.4 Disparities in non-monetary measures: evidence of an urban- 
rural split?
An oblast level study provides a good opportunity to explore what evidence there is 
for an urban-rural distinction in education provision. As we have seen, total 
education expenditure was uncorrelated with urbanization in Novgorod in 1996, 
although planned spending per child was higher in raions with larger rural 
populations. In this section I ask whether other indicators of standard of educational 
provision suggest any bias against rural schools. The four indicators which were 
examined are kindergarten enrolment, pupil-teacher ratios, the percentage of 
teachers with higher education and the percentage of 17 year olds going on to higher 
education.
The results for kindergarten enrolment are the most interesting. Kindergarten 
enrolment among one-to-sixes in 1996 was higher where education expenditure per 
child was higher, and higher also in larger raions, suggesting possible economies of 
scale; but urbanization was insignificant. However, both of the latter results were 
driven in part by the influence of Novgorod City. With Novgorod City excluded,
35 Data from the Centre for Economic Conjunctura.
36 It is worth noting as an aside here that the 20% policy naturally means extra money for 
kindergartens which are already able to spend more. An examination of the amount spent on 
kindergartens in Novgorod City and Shimsk Raion suggests that the average kindergarten in 
Novgorod could charge 6% and still get 2,000 roubles a day, while a Shimsk kindergarten could 




























































































both spending and raion size were still significant, but so was urbanization: 
remarkably, raions with higher rural shares in the population tended to have higher 
kindergarten enrolment. The degree of explanatory power of these variables is 
limited: in a regression run on enrolment in all raions but Novgorod, only about a 
third of the variation could be explained by all three factors together, while the 
correlation with urbanization alone was just 0.13 (negative). However, the fact that 
enrolment has no positive relationship with urbanization remains surprising.
Pupil-teacher ratios in general schools are available not only by raion but also 
with an urban-rural breakdown within each raion. As would be expected, there is a 
significant difference between the two. In urban areas averages range across raions 
from 11 to 16 children per teacher employed, while in rural areas the maximum is 11 
and the minimum just 4. Once the degree of urbanization is taken into account, 
expenditure has no impact, although the size of the raion is relevant (smaller raions 
having lower ratios). However, it is worth noting that while pupil teacher ratios have 
fallen in urban areas since 1990 (from 15.4 on average to 14.2), supposedly because 
of aging pupil populations, they have risen in rural areas (from 7.6 to 8.5), as schools 
have been closing down. So there does seem to be a process of rationalization going 
on, presumably at the price of longer daily journeys for some rural pupils.
The percentage of teachers who have a higher education tends to be slightly 
higher in urban areas, though within group variation is also high. The percentage 
varies between 67 and 90% in urban areas and between 60 and 84% in rural areas. 
There is no correlation with education spending.
Finally, there is no clear explanation of the percentage of 17 year old school 
leavers going on to higher education. There are two outliers here, Novgorod City at 
74% and (for reasons which are unclear) Solyetsky Raion at 67%, with all other 
raions lagging behind between 17 and 50%. Among this majority group there was no 
relation with urbanization, nor indeed with proximity to Novgorod City, where the 
higher education institutions are found. I was told in Novgorod that there are special 
policies to make higher education entrance easier for pupils from rural areas, and it 
may be that these are reasonably successful. For example, it seems that rural pupils 
can gain automatic entry to Novgorod State University in the faculty of their choice. 
A professor in the new faculty of Fashion and Design told me her star student was a 
boy from a rural raion who turned up and took advantage of this policy: over 100 
local students took exams in fine art to compete for one of ten available places, 
while this student walked in having never drawn anything before in his life. Such 
cases may explain some of the feeling I was surprised to find among residents of 
Novgorod City that rural pupils were actually relatively privileged. On the other 
hand these cases are clearly fairly rare; and Novgorod City still finds itself in a 




























































































4.5 Non-budgetary sources of finance
So far this paper has been concerned entirely with budgetary resources, but in 
practice extra-budgetary or private sources of funding are becoming increasingly 
important. These can broadly be divided into two types: fees charged by non­
governmental institutions, and extra-budgetary funds raised by state institutions to 
supplement their budget allocations.
To date fee-paying institutions play a relatively minor role in Novgorod. There 
are three gymnasia and one kindergarten which charge fees, covering in total about 
1% of all children in the oblast.37 These institutions are referred to as ‘non­
governmental’ rather than private as in principle they need not necessarily charge 
pupils but may raise funds through charity or sponsorship. The difference from state 
institutions is that they have the right to demand fees if they wish to, while 
government institutions are obliged to provide at least the basic curriculum free of 
charge. One striking fact is that, as long as they receive state accreditation, non­
government schools are eligible for budgetary financing on the same basis as other 
schools38; a remarkably free market approach to education provision, in which 
resources follow the child even if the child chooses to opt out of state provision. 
However, I was told that in practice non-governmental institutions always receive 
less than others as they are never given priority for repairs etc. Fees for both 
gymnasia and kindergarten were about 250,000 roubles a month in the first half of 
1997, compared to a teacher’s average wage of less than 400,000. These schools are 
all new — there is no opt-out policy for current governmental institutions. But it 
seems that anyone can start a school, although accreditation may not be so easy to 
achieve.
State schools are obliged to provide the basic curriculum, as laid down in federal 
law, free of charge. Beyond this, however, they can raise additional funds in almost 
any way they like. The Federal Law on Education confirms that schools can set up 
extra-budgetary funds and engage in a number of different types of money-making 
activity,39 and the oblast authorities in Novgorod have made a point of encouraging 
this activity. As noted above, part of the purpose of giving budget autonomy to 
school directors was to encourage fund raising by reassuring school directors that 
any funds raised would not be ‘crowded out’ by cuts in budgetary allocations.
17 However, this is higher than the share of children in private schools in Russia as a whole, 
estimated at under 0.5% by M.Leontyeva, Head of the Department of General Secondary 
Education in the MGPE (OECD Review of Education Policy in the Russian Federation, Moscow, 
16-17 June 1997).
38 Federal Law on Education, Article 41.7.




























































































Furthermore, as long as the money raised is spent on the institution it is not treated 
as profit and is not taxed.
School money-making activity tends to take two forms: provision of ‘additional 
paid educational services’ over and above the basic curriculum, and fund-raising 
through ‘voluntary contributions’. Examples of paid extra services include after­
school clubs, music and dance, extra languages and coaching for university entrance. 
The basic curriculum includes one foreign language, for example, so most schools 
will provide English free and then, if they have qualified staff, provide French or 
German for a charge. In some schools in Novgorod City university lecturers give 
lessons after school to the graduating class to prepare them for university entrance 
exams. (Arrears in university salary payments are even higher than in the 
compulsory school sector, so some lecturers survive by doing this.) I was also told 
by parents that some state schools have two parallel classes for all subjects; a fee­
paying one and a free one.
The second standard method for both schools and kindergartens is to call on 
‘voluntary’ type contributions from parents to repair and redecorate school buildings 
and buy new furniture and equipment. This is in effect a compulsory fee which 
parents seem resigned to paying; it also turns out to be nothing new and was typical 
during the Soviet era. In Novgorod City parents told me they paid 20,000 roubles a 
month: if this is the case for all parents, it would add up annually to about 10% of 
what is spent from the budget. Parents are also expected to turn out to help with 
painting and repairs, as are children from older classes. One fifteen year old told me 
her class sometimes had to ‘volunteer’ to stay after class to help mend the furniture. 
She said you could always refuse, but then ‘they look at you badly’.
Another Soviet era way of economizing is for schools to grow food on their own 
plots of land for school meals, or in a few cases to sell for extra funds. The children 
will help in the garden as part of a practical lesson, or parents are brought in to help. 
This applies mostly to rural schools; in urban areas parents might donate something 
from their own allotments. As seen above, raions must provide schools with a certain 
amount per child for school meals, but this is a tiny sum, enough for about half a loaf 
of bread per child per month. Some schools in Novgorod City also charge for school 
meals, although parents told me that whether they charged or not the result was 
minimal, and that most children took their own food.
‘Gifts’ such as televisions or computers are a third type of in kind assistance. 
There appears to be some feeling however among parents and pupils that such gifts 
are a way of buying a child greater attention, better marks or even entrance to an 
institution. One Novgorod City mother in search of a kindergarten for her child told 
me that at each one she visited she was asked openly what she and her husband 




























































































clear she was told the kindergarten was full for the foreseeable future. She 
eventually secured her daughter a place by agreeing to make costumes for the 
children’s plays.
Parents also help by buying textbooks. The authorities claimed that the situation 
was bad but not desperate, and that for the moment books were provided, but 
parents told me that at least in older classes it was standard to buy one’s own. At the 
beginning of the year teachers provide the class with a list of necessary books as a 
matter of course. Textbooks are apparently extremely expensive -- as much as 
100,000 roubles each, which is about $17, or one eighth of average per capita 
income at the end of 1996. If a child’s parents cannot afford to buy the books he or 
she works with friends or copies from the teacher’s book after class.
Another type of contribution which schools are entitled to pursue is to attract 
sponsorship. So far this is seen in the Soviet light of having close links with an 
enterprise which helps the school out, which means that for now there is virtually 
none as all but one or two of the old state enterprises are bankrupt. I was interested 
to know whether sponsorship could be interpreted in a more Western manner, 
allowing, for instance, Pepsi to come along and match budget funding in exchange 
for blanket advertising inside schools. The oblast administration found the idea of 
Pepsi wanting to do such a thing highly entertaining, but it does not seem completely 
implausible.40
Finally, schools also have the right to engage in ‘profit-making activity’, where 
this includes trading in goods, dealing in shares, and renting out their property. For 
the moment these activities do not seem to be very common, and certainly from the 
school property I saw I couldn’t see renting being an option for the near future. But, 
like sponsorship, it raises some disturbing possibilities for the future. Schools may 
well prove happy to hire out their playgrounds in the interests of their classrooms.
Much of the evidence presented above is, of course, anecdotal, but the overriding 
impression I got from talking to parents, pupils and local education authorities was 
that all schools and kindergartens are out to make money or find equipment from 
wherever they can. Given the budget figures seen above, which suggest that there is 
almost no money available for equipment, books, furniture, decoration or even 
repairs, this is not surprising. But it is clearly worrying for equity, and on two 
different counts. First, there is the obvious question of individual equity if children 
are unable to find a kindergarten place or have a fair shot at university entrance
40 For instance, instead of the quickly forgotten ‘Project Blue’ campaign in April 1996, Pepsi 
could have doubled the year’s education funding in five oblasts of Novgorod’s size. 'Project Blue’ 
consisted of repackaging Pepsi in blue cans and cost $500 million. (‘Turning Pepsi Blue’, The 





























































































exams without paying for them. Second, all the money that is available from parents 
is concentrated in the big towns, so there is also a regional equity issue. Budgetary 
allocations may be equalized across raions, but as non-budgetary sources become 
more important so will the differences in funding between urban and rural schools.
How important are these additional sources of finance? Novgorod City 
Department of Education estimated off-budget sources to provide about 10% of total 
financing in government schools. In rural Shimsk Raion on the other hand the Head 
of the Education Division thought the idea of offering parents extra classes for a 
charge a bit laughable, given that many of the parents are unwaged while few of the 
teachers are qualified to teach extra languages and skills. He did say that it was 
common practice for parents to be mobilized to paint the classrooms and carry out 
basic repairs and also to make a donation to the cost of materials, adding that it was 
a practice he was opposed to, but that if the raion could not afford to do the work 
itself it could hardly object. Putting pressure on the parents was a better alternative 
to dirty classrooms and broken bookshelves. This attitude seemed to sum it up. The 
fact that schools are turning into mini-businesses out to exploit parents for 
everything they can is disturbing, but at the same time it is not clear what options 
they have.
5. Conclusions
The main aim of this paper was to explore the extent of differences in the provision 
of education between raions in Novgorod Oblast. To some degree the paper’s 
findings are optimistic. First, despite considerable disparities between raions in own 
revenues raised, disparities in final revenues and hence in budget expenditures per 
capita turn out to be relatively small. The oblast has a strong transfer mechanism to 
support poorer areas, and those differences in final revenues which remain are better 
explained by the minimum budget calculated for each raion by the oblast than by the 
raion’s own initial economic position.
The result is that raion disparities in budgetary expenditure on education are also 
lower than might be expected. Disparities that do exist are hard to interpret as in part 
they may represent the impact of one-off expenditures on essential repairs rather 
than a persistent trend towards higher spending in some raions over others. The 
urgency with which repairs are required could affect not only how a raion chooses to 
spend its revenues, but also the level of revenues themselves; as although 
theoretically transfer allocations are determined by formula, in practice funds 




























































































precedence to the expenditures it considers to be most pressing. This could mean 
that disparities are less unfair than they appear. Futhermore, neither budgetary nor 
non-budgetary measures of disparity revealed a bias against rural areas.
However, the paper also points to some more worrying tendencies. First, it 
confirms that education expenditures are at a disturbingly low level. If budgetary 
expenditures are fairly even across raions, it is because in all areas they are close to 
the same subsistence level in which only the very most essential items are covered. 
Resources are earmarked for wages, maintenance or urgent repairs before they have 
even arrived in raion or school budgets. There appears to be almost no money 
available for equipment, furniture or school supplies.
This situation is leading schools to engage in frantic fund-raising activity, actively 
encouraged by the oblast authorities, who see no other solution. Schools seems to be 
exploiting every possible opportunity to raise money and in-kind assistance from 
parents. This is understandable, but raises serious concerns about both individual 
and regional equity, as parents able to make gifts which will benefit the whole 
school community (televisions, computers) will all be found in the main urban 
centres. Schools in Novgorod City in particular are likely to benefit from this type of 
assistance. On the other hand, pupils in rural areas at least all find themselves in the 
same boat. Their schools may be in worse condition, but they do not face unfair 
competition from children with richer parents.
Finally, however, we need to ask how typical Novgorod is. How much of this 
scenario is likely to be unique and how much generalizable to other areas? The 
formula mechanism used to determine transfers to raions is based on the federal 
transfer formula and as such is likely to be standard. However, in Novgorod the 
transfer fund is simply formed from the transfers the oblast itself receives from the 
federal fund, and how widespread this is as a practice is not clear. If it is the norm, 
the implications are interesting, as it would mean that poorer regions like Novgorod 
would automatically have stronger internal redistribution systems.
In terms of education expenditure, evidence of both the severe lack of funds and 
the attempts by schools to supplement their incomes just confirms reports from other 
parts of the country. For example, the Examiners’ Report of the OECD Review of 
Education Policy in Russia lists as cause for concern a series of cases similar to 
those observed in Novgorod (OECD, 1997, especially pp.63-64). It mentions the 
prevalence of special clubs and extra-curricular activities for children whose parents 
can afford to pay; ‘desirable’ schools which admit pupils on condition that parents 
make a substantial donation to the school; and cases of teachers tutoring students, 
including their own, for pay. What is not so clear is whether in all regions oblast and 
raion authorities are so forthright in encouraging schools to engage in this type of 




























































































important prerequisite to encouraging schools to find their own funds, appears to he 
proceeding much more quickly in Novgorod than elsewhere. More than this, the 
OECD Review discovered that some oblasts actually have laws prohibiting schools 
from fund-raising (OECD, 1997, p.65). This practice (though a contravention of 
federal law) should help prevent some of the unfair practices outlined above, but. as 
the Examiners’ Report argues, at the cost of aggravating poor financial conditions 
yet further. It seems that there may be a split between oblasts which try to preserve 
equity of provision even if this means deteriorating standards for all, and those like 
Novgorod which, for better or worse, maintain that the urgency with which 





























































































Terms of the formula for allocation of equalizing transfers to raions in 199611 
Round 1: Regions in need of support
Raions are classified as 'in need of support' if their predicted per capita revenue in the year in 
question is less than the predicted average per capita revenue in the oblast as a whole. Predicted 
revenues are calculated by taking 1995 revenues and adjusting for changes in tax and retention 
rates for 1996 (expected changes in the economy do not appear to be taken into account).
In practice all raions classify as such, as the average revenue level is calculated to include all 
revenues staying in the oblast, among them those passed up to the oblast level. The raion's 
theoretical transfer is then calculated as :
1. Tl« = [1 - (REVr / REV.)] * EXPr * POP*
where:
T Ir = total transfers to raion R in stage 1;
REV0 = predicted per capita revenues in the oblast as a whole (including those going to the 
oblast budget);
REVr = predicted per capita revenues staying in the raion;
EXPr = per capita expenditures estimated to be needed in the raion (the ‘minimum 
budget’); and
POPr = the raion population.
The level of transfer per capita is thus a positive function both of the degree to which raion per 
capita revenues are expected to fall below oblast per capita revenues, and of the level of per capita 
expenditures estimated to be needed in the raion. The latter (the minimum budget) is calculated by 
taking expenditures in 1991 and adjusting for inflation, for changes in raion responsibilities, for 
changes in federal norms on social assistance and benefit payments and for changes in the numbers 
of school children and orphans.
Round 2: Regions in need of considerable support
In the second stage raions are labelled ‘in need of considerable support' if their revenues including 
first stage transfers are still going to be insufficient to meet their estimated necessary expenditures. 
In that case they are allocated the difference, that is:
2. T2r = EXPr -(REVr + T1r)
where T2R are total transfers to raion R in the second stage. (If necessary expenditures are less 
than revenues including first stage transfers, naturally no transfer is made.)
41 As explained to me in the Budget Department of the Finance Committee of the Novgorod 
Oblast Administration, and with the assistance of the Budget Department note on ‘Method for 





























































































Adjusting for total available funds
The total transfer made in theory is in then simply the sum TIr + T2r. However, the role played 
by the minimum budget in both stages of the formula means that there is no guarantee that total 
transfers to be made will be matched by available funds, as minimum budgets are calculated quite 
independently of oblast revenues. So the sum T 1R + T2R really determines, not a fixed rouble sum, 
but the share the raion should receive of the funds that are available in practice. In other words, 
despite the law, raions will only be sure of covering their minimum budgets if transfer funds allow. 
In Novgorod the oblast authorities take the transfers which they receive from the federal transfer 
fund (the Federal Fund for Financial Support to the Subjects of the Federation), and simply pass 
them on to the raions using this formula.
Appendix B
List of main officials met
Oblast Administration
Nina Fyodorova, Deputy Head, Oblast Administration
Education Committee
Vladimir Averkin, Chair
Tatyana Pavlova, Deputy Chair
Nina Ivanova, Head of Finance Department
Finance Committee
Tatyana Belova, Head of Budget Department 
Vera Yakolevna, Chief Accountant
Economics Committee
Vladislav Alexeev, Department of Development of Small Enterprises
Raion Administrations
Novgorod City Administration
Natalya Ribnikova, Deputy Chair, Education Committee
Shimsk Raion Administration
Nikolai Golubev, Head, Department of Education
Valdai Raion Administration
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